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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920308-CA 
v. i 
DAVID BRYANT WICKS, i Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant David Bryant Wicks appeals his conviction of 
forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-501 (1990), in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for 
Washington County, Utah, the Honorable James L. Shumate presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's pro se 
motion to vacate judgment which was based on alleged inadequate 
disclosure of his presentence report, where the contents of the 
report were available prior to sentencing, where defendant made no 
affirmative effort to obtain a copy of the report, and where 
defendant raised no objection to the contents of the report at the 
sentencing hearing? 
The denial of a motion to vacate judgment is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Vilil, 784 
P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (but noting that in cases where the 
motion is based on a jurisdictional claim, the court will apply a 
correction of error standard); Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259, 261 
(Utah App. 1992). The trial court, however, orally referred to 
defendant's pending action not as a motion to vacate judgment, but 
rather as a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. ,fA motion to set 
aside a plea after sentencing is addressed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court. Unless the allegations and proof of facts have 
the effect of requiring the trial court, as a matter of law, to 
grant the motion, no abuse of discretion has been shown." State v. 
Soper, 559 P.2d 951, 953-54 (Utah 1977). Under either rubric, 
then, the standard of review is the same. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 6-301(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration, 
governing presentence investigation reports in the district courts, 
states: 
Presentence investigation reports shall be 
delivered to the Court or Clerk of the Court two 
working days in advance of sentencing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After being extradited from Ohio pursuant to a governor's 
warrant (R. 59), defendant entered a plea of guilty in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court, Washington County, to a charge of forgery, 
a third degree felony (R. 41 and Tr. of 3/9/92 at 16). At a 
hearing on April 8, 1992, he was sentenced to the Utah State Prison 
for a term not to exceed five years and ordered to pay restitution 
in the amount of $3115 (R. 42 and Tr. of 4/8/92 at 7). Following 
the sentencing hearing, defendant filed a pro se motion that he 
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termed a motion to vacate (R. 46-59) but that the court viewed as 
more properly a motion to withdraw guilty plea. At a hearing on 
May 13, 1992, the trial court denied the motion (Tr. of 5/13/92 at 
13, 14). Defendant now appeals, claiming that: 1) he was denied 
his constitutional right to a speedy trial because of the excessive 
time lapse between his arrest in Ohio and the disposition of the 
charges in Utah; and 2) he did not have an opportunity to 
adequately review his presentence report prior to sentencing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All relevant facts are included in the Statement of the 
Case and Point Two of the state's argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion. 
Defendant concedes that his first point on appeal, denial of his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial, is without merit. His 
second point, that defendant was allowed inadequate access to his 
presentence report, must also fail because defendant raised the 
issue for the first time only after he was sentenced. By failing 
to make a timely objection, he has waived the issue on appeal. The 
decision of the trial court to deny defendant's motion to vacate 




DEFENSE COUNSEL ADMITS THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DELAY BETWEEN HIS ARREST 
IN OHIO AND THE DISPOSITION OF CHARGES AGAINST 
HIM IN UTAH AND THAT, CONSEQUENTLY, 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL IS 
WITHOUT MERIT. THE COURT, THEREFORE, NEED NOT 
CONSIDER THE ISSUE. 
Defense counsel has attempted to dispose of defendant's 
claim that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial 
by presenting what he terms "an Anders type argumemt" (Appellant's 
br. at 4). However, a brief patterned after the requirements laid 
out by the United States Supreme Court in Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738 (1967), and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), is appropriate only in limited 
circumstances. Only when appointed counsel believes that an 
indigent client's criminal appeal is without merit can such a brief 
be filed. State v. Clayton, 638 P.2d at 169. And, the case must 
be "wholly frivolous." Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 341 
(Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) (emphasis 
added). An Anders brief is not appropriate in cases which include 
both frivolous and nonfrivolous claims.1 Id. 
In this case, defendant's brief contains two issues, one 
of which defense counsel admits is without merit and another that 
he claims is meritorious. Such a bifurcated approach to briefing 
1
 Even if this were an appropriate case for Anders briefing, 
defense counsel has failed to meet the specific requirements of 
such a brief. See State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d at 169-70. 
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has been explicitly rejected by this Court. Butterfield v. Cook, 
817 P.2d at 341. Allowing meritless issues to be brought on appeal 
"would demonstrate a lack of confidence in the appellate bar's 
ability to distinguish between frivolous and nonfrivolous issues." 
Id. In addition, it would unnecessarily increase the workload of 
both court and counsel by encouraging criminal appellants to 
present meritless issues alongside those with obvious merit. Id. 
Defendant's claim should not have been brought before 
this Court in the first place. No argument has been made that it 
is meritorious, and it need not be considered on appeal. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION ON APPEAL THAT HE HAD 
INADEQUATE ACCESS TO HIS PRESENTENCE REPORT IS 
DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO HIS STATED POSITION PRIOR 
TO SENTENCING. BY FAILING TO RAISE THE ISSUE PRIOR 
TO SENTENCING AND, ADDITIONALLY, BY AFFIRMATIVELY 
STATING AT THE SENTENCING HEARING THAT HE WAS 
UNCONCERNED WITH THE CONTENTS OF THE REPORT, 
DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO IT. THE TRIAL 
COURT, THEREFORE, WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT. 
The state readily acknowledges defendant's due process 
right of access to his presentence report. Gardner v. Florida, 430 
U.S. 349, 358 (1977); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 
1985); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982); State v. 
Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980). Notably, in this case, it 
is not disputed that the full presentence report was disclosed to 
defendant's attorney prior to the sentencing hearing. Nor is it 
argued that Rule 6-301 of the Code of Judicial Administration, 
requiring that the presentence report be delivered to the district 
court "two working days in advance of sentencing," was violated. 
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Nor is there any record evidence to demonstrate that defendant 
petitioned the court for additional access to the report or in any 
other way indicated discontent with what he claims is the usual 
practice in the Fifth Judicial District (Appellant's Br. at 5). 
Instead, defendant argues on appeal that the disclosure 
was insufficient because a copy of the report was not personally 
delivered to him and because he learned of information contained in 
the report only on the day of sentencing. Allegedly, this 
disclosure gave him an inadequate opportunity to review the 
document with his attorney and to rebut information contained in it 
(Appellant's br. at 6-7). This argument is plainly inconsistent 
with statements made by both defendant and his counsel at 
defendant's sentencing hearing. 
At that hearing on April 8, 1992, the following colloquy 
occurred: 
The Court: The Court has received the presentence 
report and has read it carefully. . . . I will hear 
you in mitigation, Mr. Terry*2 
Mr. Terry: Your Honor, the Court has read the 
presentence report and is aware of the 
recommendation. Mr. Wicks is also. However, 
I would ask the Court . . .[counsel then 
offers drug dependency as a mitigating 
circumstance]. 
(Transcript of 4/8/92 Hearing at 2-3). Counsel raised no objection 
at the sentencing hearing to inadequate access to the presentence 
report, thus implying that neither the disclosure nor the contents 
of the report were problematic. Counsel had plainly seen the 
Douglas Terry was defendant's trial counsel. 
6 
report and communicated at least the recommendation to defendant. 
Apparently, both had accepted the contents at face value. 
After counsel finished his mitigation statement/ the 
court asked defendant if he had anything to say in his own behalf. 
Defendant offered extended remarks about his inability to 
rehabilitate himself on his own, stating among other things: 
So to lessen the burden on society and to be able 
to do something for mef I'm going to ask that you 
be a little bit more harder than what — I didn't 
even get a chance to see that presentence report. 
But whatever it saysf it's not enough. I need 
something a little bit more harder to stop this 
from happening again. . . . 
(Transcript of 4/8/92 Hearing at 4). A fair implication from 
defendant's statement is that he wished the court to accept the 
truth of the report and then impose an even stiffer sentence than 
recommended in order to aid him in correcting his errant behavior. 
This is not a statement from someone who believes that he has been 
given inadequate access to his presentence report or someone who 
thinks that the fundamental fairness of the sentencing procedure is 
being compromised. Counsel's failure to object to the report or 
seek a continuance/ in conjunction with defendant's articulated 
lack of concern with both his access and the substantive content of 
the report/ served to waive any objection to it. 
After defendant was sentenced for up to five years in the 
Utah State Prison/ he filed a pro se motion to vacate judgment in 
which he asserted/ inter alia, inadequate access to the presentence 
report, which he claimed contained numerous inaccuracies. At the 
May 13/ 1992 hearing on that motion, defendant strenuously argued 
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that the inaccuracies had caused the court to impose a sentence 
more severe than would have been warranted had the truth been 
known. (Tr. of 5/13/92 at 7). 
Plainly, defendant is trying to have it both ways. He 
took an unequivocal position at the sentencing hearing, asking for 
a strict sentence. When the court meted out just such a sentence, 
defendant balked and reversed his position. The court was well 
within its discretion in not allowing defendant to change his 
position at this juncture. 
In ruling against defendant, the court failed to address 
the issue of access to the presentence report. Nonetheless, this 
Court can affirm the trial court on any proper ground. State v. 
Brvan, 709 P. 2d 256, 260 (Utah 1985). Based on defendant's failure 
to raise the issue prior to sentencing, defendant has waived his 
argument on appeal. Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P.2d 587, 589 
(Utah App. 1990). 
CONCLUSION 
Because defense counsel concedes that defendant was not 
denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial and because 
defendant's objection to the presentence report was raised only 
after sentencing and will not suffice to preseirve the issue for 
appeal, the decision of the trial court to deny defendant's motion 
to vacate judgment should be affirmed. 
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